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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ARNELL H. WELCHMAN and EVA B.
WELCHMAN,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.-

Case No.
8718

MERRILL J. WOOD, djbja Wood
Realty Company, and MILO D.
CARTER,

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondents respectfully :request the court to review
the brief record, including appellants deposition, in this
case to be advised of the fact situation that it might not
suppose the "Statement of Facts" as recited in appellants'
brief herein fully satisfies the case.
Having received all proffer·ed evidence the trial
court felt moved to say: "There was no real agreement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by way of parole-nothing that was not anticipated in
the written agreement. Plaintiffs have indicated that
there simply was 'puffing' talk."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 8th day of March, 1956, appellants
entered into a Sales Agency Contract with the respondent Merrill J. Wood d/b/a Wood Realty Company. (R
pg 15 and 31 ) Said contract stated in part : "In consideration of your agreement to list the property described
on the reverse side of this contract with the Multiple
Listing Bureau of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board ... I
hereby grant you ... the exclusive right to sell or exchange said property . . . if you find a buyer who is ready
willing and able to buy or exchange said property . . . or
if said property is sold or exchanged ... I agree to pay
the commission recommended by the Salt Lake Real
Estate Board . . "
Appellant deposes and says that the house so listed
for sale or trade was in fact traded due to the efforts of
respondents. ( Dep. pg 6, 7) Appellants lived in the house
that they traded for, (Dep. pg 7) and traded the said
listed house for the top listing price and received the
equivalent of $5000 as a down payment. (Dep. pg 8, 9)
The known and contractual sales commission was paid
(Dep pg 11) with no protest and recognizing the same as
a contractual obligation. (Dep. pg 12) Appellant deposes and says that to his knowledge there never was any
other written contract than the above mentioned Sales
Agency Contract. (Dep. pg 43)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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During the period of time that said contract was
being executed one of the appellants worked in the respondent's real estate office as a licensed real estate salesman. (Dep. pg 18-19)
There are numerous allegations by the appellants
that respondents assisted appellants in many ways in
appellant's various attempts to raise monies by mortgaging their newly acquired home or selling the equity in
the real estate contract that appellants retained on their
original house.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Appellants' claim, as alleged and set forth in their
first cause of action, is barred by the provisions of the
U. C. A., Title 25-5-4 ( 5).
2. Appellants' claim, as alleged and set forth in their
second cause of action, is barred by the provisions of the
U. C. A., Title 25-5-4 (5) and the Utah Supreme Court's
interpretation thereof.
3. There is no evidence of record, which, when viewed in a light most favorable to appellants, indicates that
there was any contract by way of parole agreement on
any subject not anticipated in the written contract.
4. There is no evidence of record that would estop
the respondents from invoking the statute of frauds as
a defense in the instant action.
ARGUMENT
1. Appellants' claim, as alleged and set forth in their
first cause of action, is barred by the provisions of the
U. C. A., Title 25-5-4 (5).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
"25-5-4 Certain agreements void unless written
and subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith ...
( 5) Every agreement authorized or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real
estate for comp·ensation.''
It is the general rule, followed by the great weight of
authority of the cases, that parties to a written agreement
coming within the provisions of the statute of frauds
may not, by mere oral agreement, modify or alter one or
more of the terms thereof and make a new agreement
resting partly in writing and partly in parole. For restatement of this principle see: 27 C. J. 327; 25 C. C. L. 708;
L. R. A. 191 7 B 14 7 (annotation) ; 17 A. L. R. 14 (annotation).
The Utah Court has held specifically on this matter
in the Combined Metals Inc. v. Bastian~ 71 U 535, 267 P
1020. In this case Combined Metals contracted with
Bastian. Bastian agreed to sell and deliver to plaintiff 335
shares of Idaho State Bank for 850,000 shares of Combined Metals Inc. stock. There was an alleged oral
contract modifying the written agreement and the court
ruled:
"Again, the original contract to be binding and
enforceable, and to satisfy the Statute of Frauds,
was required to be, as it was, in writing and subscribed by the parties to be charged. To alter or
modify any of its material parts or terms by a subsequent agreement required one also to be in
writing and so subscribed ... ''
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In another Utah case where the portion quoted from
the pleadings is substantially identical with the pleadings
in the instant case the court said in Case v. Ralph, 56 U
243, 188 p 640:
"What the statute requires is that the employment
or authority of the agent to sell or procure a purchaser must be evidenced by an express agreement
in writing ... (the fact that there was an allegation
that there was) ... agreement to pay commission
and that he was paid $375.00 by defendant are
therefore wholly insufficient to meet the requirements of the statute.
It is there alleged that 'at the special instance and
request of said defendant this plaintiff did negotiate and was instrumental in securing . . . the
value of said property and take and receive the
said option to purchase'. All of these statements
rnay be true . . . yet there is not an intimation even
that what is all·eged was done by virtue of an express contract ... the allegations of the complaint
are insufficient to state a cause of action for the
reason that no express contract . . .is alleged."
If all that the appellants allege in their alleged first
cause of action were true there would be no actionable
cause of action in the light of statute and case law.

2. Appellants' claim, as alleged and set forth in their
second cause of action, is barred by the provisions of the
U. C. A., Title 25-5-4 (5) and the Utah Supreme Court's
interpretation thereof.
Appellants' alleged second cause of action attempts
to plead in equity. The question then must be resolved:
equity to whom? The record testimony speaks for itself
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largely through appellants own testimony. Every provision that the appellants contracted for was had.
While we insist the better rule to be that a contract
required by the statute of frauds to be in writing cannot
be modified in any particular by a subsequent oral contract, we also insist that the cases cited by the appellant
are not in point for the reason that none of the theories
upon which the cases were decided would apply to the
case at bar. Consid.er Kerr v. Hillyard~ 51 U 364. Herein
plaintiff contracted with the defendant to purchase a
farm and as much included personal property as defendant could for $7500.00. Plaintiff furnished defendant with
the money. Defendant's commission was to be one haH
of the personal property that was sold from the farm--not
to exceed $300.00. Defendant got $850.00 worth of personal property with plaintiff's money, converting it to his
own use and fraudulently withheld the knowledge of this
secret profit from the plaintiff. Plaintiff sues for an
accounting of the personal property because of the fraudulent behavior of defendant and defendant defended saying the original contract was oral and void under the
Statute of Frauds. The court found that the defendant
had wrongfully detained the property in excess of $300.00
commission and gave judgement for the difference between the $300.00 and what the defendant actually
bought with the plaintiff's money. The court stated:
" ... plaintiff is not suing defendant to enforce
a contract relating to the purchase of or sale of
real property . . . When the agreement relative
to the purchase of the farm had been fully exeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

g_
cuted, however, then there was no longer any
legal obstacle in the way which would prevent
the plaintiff from compelling the defendant to
account for the personal property he had received
... in excess of the $300.00, which was the amount
of the compensation, all of which he had received
and retained."
As the words of the court suggest, this case is simply
not is point. (a) There is no fraud nor claim of fraud
in the instant case and such was the pivotal point in the
cited case. (b) In the instant fact situation the alleged
cause of action is based upon a sale or trade of real estate
and the commision therefore. The cited case specifically
and expressly was not such a situation, but was a suit for
an accounting because of fraud. (c) In the instant case
the original contract was in writing, satisfying the statute,
and the parties acted in accordance with the contract.
None of this was fact in the cited case.
Appellants further cite the Utah case Bamberger Co.
v. Certified Production, 88 U 194; 48 P2nd 489, a wholly
dissimilar case wherein plaintiffs entered into a written
lease letting property. They sued in equity for restitution
of premises because premises had not been kept free from
liens etc. as per lease. A defense was entered that there
were oral agreements changing the lease. The court held :
'If a party has changed his position by performing
an oral modification so that it would be inequitable
to permit the other party to found a claim upon
the original agreement as unmodified or defeat
the former's claim by setting up a defense that
performance was not according to the written contract, after he has induced or consented to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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other going foreward, the modified agreement
should be held valid."
In the pleading of the alleged second cause of action
there is no allegation, nor has there been subsequent pretended evidence, on the part of the appellants that they
did anything that was different or that was not anticipated in the original written contract. There is no pleading in the alleged equitable cause of action that appellants
assumed a new position by virtue of the alleged oral
modifications. Thus this case does not apply to the facts
of the case at bar.
The equity in the case at bar is clearly with the
respondents, who, by appellants admission, performed
the contracted for duties of procuring a trade for appellants' house. Appellants were the beneficiaries and recipients of said services of respondents and lived in the house
thus acquired until after the commencement of this action.
The court in the Bamberger Case, supra, went to
lengths to assure the reader that it did not intend to
write new law than the general rule above cited. As part
of its ruling dictum the court controls the case at bar as
follows:
"The rule that there can be no oral modification
of a contract required by the statute of frauds to
be in writing has been most rigidly enforced in
England . . . Most of the courts of this country
hold, as a general rule, that an oral modification
of a contract required by the statute of frauds to
be in writing will not be permitted.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
The narrow area of exception to this rule is carefully
restricted in its application by this decision to fact situations other than the one at bar.
3. There is no evidence of record, which, when viewed in a light most favorable to appellants, indicates that
there was any contract by way of parole agreement on
any subject not anticipated in the written contract.
4. There is no evidence of record that would estop
the respondents from invoking the Statute of Frauds as
a defense in the instant action.
Succumbing to the temptation of a scatter-gun
attack, in the absence of a bona fide cause of action,
appellants finally cry: "We also rely upon an equitable
estoppel of respondent's assertion of the statute of frauds"
and cite the Utah case Kelly v. .Richards, 95 U 560; 83 P
2nd 731, as though the court in said case santioned this
sort of straw grasping. Quite to the contrary, cited case
deals the death blow to the appellants' contention.
Therein the court says:
"There can be no estoppel if either of these elements are wanting.'
The court then names false representation as one
of the essential elements and says:
'The party on whom it (false representation) was
made must have been without knowledge, or
means of knowledge, of the material of the real
facts."
Appellants admit (Dep. pg 18-19) that one of the
appellants was employed in the real estate office of respondents during the instant transaction. Appellants
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testify that they knew that the respondents were not in
the money lending business (Dep. pg 27-27) and knew
that respondents could not guarantee F. H. A. appraisals
and knew that respondents were not F. H. A. appraisers
nor guarantors of loans. Indeed the appellants made
their own application for loans through others.
31 Corpus Juris Secundum 288 cites the Kelly Case,
supra, to illustrate the general rule: "To create an
estoppel the representation relied on must be a statement
of a material fact, and not an expression of opinion."
Appellants had reason to know which of the alleged statements were opinion and which were not.
CONCLUSION
If all that the appellants have said of record were
true, and respondents deny that it is true, the lower
court was correct in granting the motion for Summary
Judgement and should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
OSCAR W. McCONKIE, Jr.
of the firm
McCONKIE & McCONKIE
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents.
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